

Introduction: Refugees, Conflict and the Search for Belonging

By Lucy Hovil

In April 2015, President Nkurunziza of Burundi announced he would run for a third term despite a constitutional provision limiting presidents to two terms. He argued that his first term did not count towards the constitutional limit as he was not popularly elected. His decision sparked fierce opposition, and protests rocked the capital Bujumbura. Although an attempted coup d'état in May 2015 was quelled, the situation rapidly escalated and Burundi, a country with a long history of mass violence that had been negotiating a protracted and painful transition towards peace since the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000, was once more destabilised. By the end of 2015, more than 225,000 refugees had fled to neighbouring states,ⁱ reversing a massive repatriation exercise that had been carried out since 2002 in which approximately half a million refugees had returned to Burundi. While the international community seemed to be caught on the back foot by this mass exodus from the country, few Burundians were surprised. They had been reading the signals of a pending crisis for months—in fact, years. Since coming to power, the government had been growing increasingly repressive, deploying a toxic mix of media control, intimidation of civil society and arbitrary arrest of opposition. The announcement of President Nkurunziza's intention to stand for a third term was simply the final straw.

These events in Burundi, in which the dividends of peace appeared to disintegrate in a matter of days, reflect many of the dynamics that have haunted Africa's Great Lakes regionⁱⁱ for decades. Conflict and displacement in the region seem to be as entrenched as they are perplexing. With the exception of Tanzania, all the countries in the region have generated refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in large numbers since independence, and all have hosted refugees. In addition to postcolonial violence that erupted in a number of countries, a pivotal moment in the region's more recent history was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The genocide and the aftershocks it generated led to conflict and displacement on a massive scale as the interconnectedness of countries in the region became painfully apparent. Its repercussions continue to be felt today throughout the region and beyond. Although stability has been retained or restored in many parts of the region, ongoing conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan in December 2013, and the growing crisis in Burundi reveal the region's continuing vulnerability to conflict. Hundreds of thousands of people in the region have remained displaced, some for decades, with no solutions in sight, while thousands of others have found themselves re-displaced.

Of course, recurrent episodes of conflict and violence are not unique to the Great Lakes region. One only has to look at the First World War, the war that was supposed to end all wars, to see how one major conflict can set the stage for another—in this case, the Second World War. Yet it is self-evident that there is insufficient understanding of and response to violence in the Great Lakes—indeed, in Africa as a whole. While there is, indisputably, a rich, academic literature that focuses on conflict in the region and that places conflict within a broader context of colonialism and postcolonialism, it has failed to sufficiently permeate and infuse both popular

and policy-based understandings of conflict and displacement. Instead, there is often a disconnect between realities on the ground and policy responses. As a result, often in situations of conflict on the continent an adjective is prescribed by external commentators that is quickly accepted as gospel—most commonly ethnic or tribal, and sometimes sectarian. Time and again, this misdiagnosis proves to be a dangerous business. Once a label is fixed to a conflict it can become not only a dominant explanation for that conflict, but can also overly influence approaches to resolution. It is not surprising, therefore, that ceasefires, peace agreements and externally enforced power sharing arrangements based on reductive understandings of causes of conflict prove to be quick fixes, little more than holding exercises until conflict breaks out again. At the same time, peace agreements that *do* incorporate text that addresses drivers of conflict often fail to be implemented.

By way of an example, for decades, a dominant populist narrative around the war in Sudan was of a war between the Muslim north and the Christian/animist south. While some disputed this narrative—and there was also a logic to it that was borne out in reality—this binary representation of conflict failed to allow for a full understanding of the multiple complex factors driving a war that was, in fact, between a centralised state and multiple sites of marginalisation across the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in 2005 was eventually whittled down to only one of its elements—the referendum on the independence of the south—despite its comprehensive provisions on democratisation and political pluralism. The referendum neither resolved conflict in the reduced state of Sudan (as evidenced by renewed conflict in Darfur and, more recently, in South Kordofan and Blue Nile), nor led to consolidated peace in the newly created state of South Sudan (now graduated to the label of ‘ethnic’ conflict). The misdiagnosis of the problem enabled those with short term political agendas to scrap the democratic transformation agenda that had been included in the CPA, and consequently the secession of the South has failed to generate peace in either Sudan or the new South Sudan.

In the same way, the prevalent interpretation of past violence in Rwanda—and, therefore, the response to that violence—has often been reduced to ethnic genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in 1994. There is seldom mention of the broader context of violence (including an ongoing rebel war and attacks on refugees camps in eastern DRC) in which the genocide took place. As a result, inadequate recognition has been given of the need to engage with broader issues of *post-conflict* (as opposed to exclusively *post-genocide*) recovery, and has enabled the post-genocide government to avoid scrutiny for its own actions. Once again, therefore, it is unsurprising that individuals continue to flee Rwanda in fear for their lives as a repressive state feeds off its genocide credit, and that the lack of honest appraisal of what took place during and after the genocide continues to haunt the region, not least in the form of cornered militias in eastern DRC trying to fight their way out of an alleged *génocidaire* cul-de-sac.

A key problem with placing conflict into these moulds is that it positions individuals caught up in them—and, often, displaced from them—into one-dimensional categories. This approach ignores local realities in which people create and maintain *multiple* forms of belonging not least in order to ensure multiple forms of legitimacy and access to resources. These strategies of belonging are highlighted by those who are forced into exile either within their own state or outside of it. While not denying that people might identify themselves along ethnic and/or

sectarian lines—just as they might identify themselves along gender or economic lines—in a context of multiple forms and expressions of belonging, the reduction of conflict to binaries inevitably falls wide of the mark. These narratives are in direct contrast to a deep and long-developed literature on conflict, citizenship and refugees, and on the exclusionary logics of states and humanitarian governance.ⁱⁱⁱ Yet somehow, when it comes to generating appropriate policy responses, they often fail to connect.

In response, this book examines the convergence of two problems— the ongoing realities of conflict and forced migration in the Great Lakes region, and the crisis of citizenship and belonging. By bringing them together, the intention is not to create a bigger problem but to see how, by looking at them in one space, one can point the way towards possible solutions. It argues that issues of inclusion and exclusion animate and sustain cycles of violence and displacement in the Great Lakes region and beyond. The likelihood of conflict increases when collective identities are mobilised, politicised and ‘hardened’ by conflict entrepreneurs, thus reducing the scope for overlapping and multiple identities that would otherwise facilitate inter-group relations. By the same logic, expanding spaces for belonging becomes an important part of creating the conditions for sustainable peace. These spaces are ones in which multiple identities can exist; in which identities are seen as fluid, ever changing; and in which systems for marking out ‘difference’ are carefully crafted so as to not create hardened boundaries of insiders and outsiders. It argues that citizenship and belonging are both the cause and part of a possible resolution to ongoing conflict and displacement in the region.

The lived reality of exile—incorporating both the response of and response to refugees— provides a litmus test for understanding these dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Causes of exile—for instance, groups being discriminated against for their association with a particular identity; the ongoing failures to create new spaces for belonging in exile in which refugees continue to be marginalised from the polity; and the many problems associated with enacting ‘durable solutions’ to displacement – are all evidence of this. Therefore, this book explores the multiple factors, dynamics or relationships that revolve around an individual refugee—or group of refugees—and the ways in which these factors enhance or compromise their ability to belong. In turn, it points towards broader issues of conflict and demonstrates why, until key issues around belonging are resolved and are reflected in equitable governance structures, the region will remain prone to the resurgence of episodes of violence, conflict and consequent displacement.

1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE FIELD RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

This book is based on six years of field research in the Great Lakes region, which formed part of a research project initiated and managed by the International Refugee Rights Initiative in conjunction with the Social Science Research Council, and for which the author was the lead researcher.^{iv} The project produced nine working papers, each focusing on one unit of field research. This book seeks to place the research in a broader frame and to draw out key findings and lessons learned from across the case studies. Each one focused, in some way, on the linkages between citizenship and forced displacement in the Great Lakes region, and specifically examined the differences and, more importantly, the interaction between local and national understandings of belonging. It intersects with a long and well-developed conversation

among scholars and policymakers about the ongoing shortcomings within the refugee policy and humanitarian regime, produced not just by the regime itself but also by the legal, political and social contexts within countries that host refugees and displaced people or who are accepting home returnees. In essence, it argues that the logic of exclusion that is at work in formal, legal mechanisms of citizenship in postcolonial states in the Great Lakes colludes with the logic of the refugee regime (as manifest in the mechanics of humanitarianism), that helps maintain exclusion as the default position for those who have been exiled from their state (and which affects the ability of those displaced internally to integrate and the prospects for return of both groups). However, it also argues that the problem is far broader, and lies in the fact that the dilemmas around access to meaningful citizenship that so adversely affect refugees in the Great Lakes region are actually born of the very logic of modern states themselves, not just postcolonial African ones.^v As Agier has argued, many of the problems relating to the humanitarian apparatus or refugee regime stem from its embeddedness in the nation-state model and, indeed, the extent to which it seeks to reproduce tightly defined nation-statist forms of governance in managing refugee subjects.^{vi}

A total of nine studies were conducted between 2008 and 2012 with refugees, internally displaced groups and returnees in seven countries of the Great Lakes region. The book also draws on subsequent visits by the author to the region, including to South Sudan in October 2015 and May 2016, and Burundi in February 2016. The main intention throughout the research was to consider the linkages between conflict and displacement on the one hand, and the dynamics of exclusion and access to citizenship on the other. Under this broad framework, specific facets were explored in each of the case studies in order to gain insight into different aspects of the lived experience of exile and possible resolution to that exile. Thus, the main question throughout the research was how issues around access to citizenship and processes of exclusion affect the experience of displacement, and the various forms of belonging that are deployed by those who are displaced in order to best find safety (freedom from fear *and* freedom from want) in exile. The scope was simultaneously broad and specific. The book does not offer full historical analyses of the many complex contextual issues that would allow each case study to become a book in its own right; there is already a rich literature that has done this. However, it does use intensely context-specific studies to illuminate the argument.

In its analysis, the book draws together two connected, but slightly different, approaches to understanding the dynamics of conflict, displacement and belonging in the Great Lakes region. In effect, the purpose is to utilise two lenses which, when combined, show where a situation is brought into focus, and where it is distorted. The first lens, a primarily legal and policy one, engages with many of the categories and assumptions that lie behind the primarily state-centric and legal framework in which refugees^{vii} are supposed to exist. The second, a more socio-anthropological lens, seeks to deprioritise, or even discard, these categorisations and instead look at forms of belonging and exclusion that exist despite, or in addition to, these structures. The book, therefore, exists in the somewhat murky waters between the demands of refugee legal protection and the rigours of social science research. It tries to hold in tension the fact that spaces for refugee protection are continually shrinking and the label, refugee, is a crucial tool for targeting and maintaining a focus on a specific legal category of people who are living with the realities of a specific set of circumstances. Yet at the same time, realities on the ground demonstrate that refugees have multiple identities, deploy multiple coping strategies, and often

defy tidy categories that inevitably fall wide of the mark. This tension is reflected in broader debates between those who emphasise the need to maintain a distinctive category of ‘refugee’ within policy discussions, and those who assert that these distinctions do not reflect realities on the ground and therefore should either be discarded or be changed.

In the case of the former, preservation of the neatly defined category of refugee is seen as crucial: the language of human rights generally, and refugee rights specifically, provides a tool for those targeting national and international policymakers. It ensures an arsenal of international (and hopefully national) legislation that can back up demands for promoting the rights of refugees. Those who fall into this camp are often practitioners who are working specifically within a human rights agenda, and who recognise that the shrinking space for protection for refugees makes this a category in need of protection. Indeed, they see any collapsing of categories as a threat to refugee protection. The author identifies strongly with this perspective.

Yet the findings also demonstrate that the shortcomings of such an approach need to be recognised: the rigidity of categorisation can all too often lead to an over-reliance on policy-driven approaches that are, by nature, a somewhat blunt instrument that fails to interact sufficiently with the context. Therefore, the book also resonates with a significant and growing body of (primarily academic) literature that emphasises the grey areas of overlapping legal and social identities and challenges many of the either/or categories (refugee and returnee; home and exile; migrant and forced migrant) that are inadequate in dealing with multiple and multi-faceted realities.^{viii} In other words, an approach that endorses the collapsing of categories. This expanding of categories is intuitively appealing for those who are comfortable dealing with ambiguities and who recognise that tidy legal categories rarely reflect reality.

This book seeks to hold these two viewpoints in tension. As a result, on the one hand there was a clear policy dimension to the study: the need for citizenship and refugee policy to be realigned, and the way in which this might take place, was unashamedly part of the motivation in carrying out the research. At the same time, the approach was mindful of the need to ensure that the research was not driven by these policy imperatives, and that the findings were able to speak for themselves *regardless* of the policy context. In many respects, the extent to which the scholarly field of forced migration has emanated from a strong policy foundation driven by impulses to understand and address complex intertwined legal and social issues relating to displacement has created a co-dependence between policy and ‘refugee’ research (and researchers). This co-dependence has remained a defining feature, and research is often judged and defined by its relevance—or ability—to engender positive change. Yet at the same time there is a growing body of literature that questions the utility of an approach that has become so strongly policy-driven. This critique focuses on the extent to which policy-driven research agendas create a somewhat impoverished debate (for instance, through leaving many forced migrants invisible),^{ix} and questions the extent to which policy has relevance at all in the midst of the lives of those who are supposedly its ‘beneficiaries’.^x This research deliberately sought to pull these two approaches together—even though, at times, it has created a somewhat awkward hybrid. It was action-oriented in its outlook, but sought to allow the context to drive any action that was promoted, rather than the other way round.

Qualitative methods of data collection were used, conducting one-on-one interviews with refugees, members of the host population and relevant officials in each of the seven countries where fieldwork was conducted. A total of 1,115 individual interviews were conducted in all. Relevant policy documents and articles on refugees, displacement, repatriation and citizenship were also incorporated into each individual study. Field research was, for the most part, conducted by teams of researchers, all of whom were trained and led by the author.^{xi} In each case study we drew upon existing networks of organisations and individuals working in the country in which the study was taking place. We ensured that there was always diversity in language skills, ethnicity, gender and nationality within each team; and we were careful to minimise the negative impact of ‘gatekeepers’ who might want to control the information we received. To the extent possible, interviews took place in the language in which the interviewee was most comfortable. We sought to avoid the use of translators where possible, instead recruiting field researchers who had the relevant language skills. We also had to adapt our methodology to highly complex security environments. Some of the research was conducted in locations where conflict was ongoing, which inevitably created specific challenges. The details of these adaptations are, by necessity, opaque. Needless to say, the security and safety of those with whom we worked, and those who were interviewed by us, was paramount throughout.

The first and ninth studies (2008 and 2012) focused on Burundian refugees who had been living in Tanzania for decades and had been offered naturalisation in Tanzania. The research asked whether this process constituted a model for genuine integration that could create new forms of national and local belonging and challenge current obsession with return as the most favourable durable solution.^{xii} The findings showed that the legal grant of citizenship was not enough. The government of Tanzania had made citizenship contingent upon refugees/new citizens dispersing and relocating across the country, which had both undermined the feasibility of the offer and threatened livelihoods. To be effective, citizenship must be equal and it must enhance local forms of attachment and connection that are most likely to enable enjoyment of the rights of citizenship at the national level.

The second study (2009) considered the realities facing Burundians who had chosen to return to Burundi. The findings showed that the *specific* ways in which communities recreate belonging at the point of return must be acknowledged if repatriation is to allow for a genuine restoration of the bond between former refugees and the state. Specifically, access to land—and often a particular piece of land—was inextricably connected to local belonging within the communities. It was a crucial marker of the restoration of a broader sense of belonging and represented not just access to livelihoods and a vital coping mechanism in a context of extreme poverty, but symbolised connection with the past, a reaffirmation of inclusion and belonging and the reclamation of a ‘lost’ citizenship. In other words, in the localities in which return was taking place, return, land and citizenship questions were shown to be intricately intertwined. A true sense of citizenship was commonly understood as contingent upon possession or repossession and ownership of land in one’s locality, a theme that resonated throughout other studies, especially the fourth study on the return of Congolese refugees living in Rwanda to North Kivu.

The third study (2010) considered the situation facing Rwandan refugees in Uganda who were

being put under immense pressure from the government of Uganda and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to return to Rwanda. It was clear that Rwanda viewed the existence of refugees as an indicator that its post-conflict restoration of the state was incomplete. The findings showed, however, that refugees did not believe in the genuineness of the invitation to reactivate their citizenship: they saw the current Rwandan state as a place that could not offer them either protection or access to livelihoods. They requested alternative forms of belonging that would allow them to retain their Rwandan citizenship but at the same time facilitate their mobility and access to opportunities in either their current host States or other States in the region and beyond.

The fourth study (2010) considered issues of belonging for those displaced within or from eastern DRC's North Kivu province. Despite a new citizenship law at the national level that affirmed the citizenship of the majority of those interviewed, it was clear that their belonging at a local level was being strongly contested and manipulated by both those in power and those who considered themselves to be more indigenous to the region than others. In particular, the extent to which groups and individuals had identified along ethnic rather than national lines (particularly where the former cross national boundaries) during the conflict had revealed a perceived level of split allegiance by some groups towards the State of the DRC that was considered unacceptable within the strongly nationalist discourse on Congolese identity and citizenship. Belonging and citizenship at the local level did not necessarily translate into national belonging, and vice versa. Indigeneity determined access to and possession of land, which in turn determined access to citizenship. This interpretation of nationality showed the huge gap between law and the lived reality of inclusion.

The fifth study (2010) focused on the return of refugees from Uganda to South Sudan in the run-up to the country's secession from Sudan. By examining the way in which refugees themselves were going about managing the process of return, it demonstrated that the rigidity of humanitarian categories and policies can undermine refugees' coping mechanisms and creativity as political actors to identify durable solutions to their problems. Freedom of movement was critical to allow people the ability to make the most out of meagre resources and a volatile security situation. In other words, the casting of return and exile in black and white were not useful and did not reflect complex realities on the ground.

The sixth case study (2011), which focused on Congolese refugees living in camps in Rwanda, demonstrated the need for repatriation to be negotiated not only at a national level but also at a local level. For this group of refugees, their very choice of exile in Rwanda had marked them out as a group that had no legitimacy to return because rightly or wrongly, their allegiance was viewed as questionable and their belonging at the local level lacked genuine links to history of indigeneity. Yet, in exile they were being denied even minimal opportunities for integration. The result was a double exclusion—no access to local integration in Rwanda, and little hope of viable return. At the same time, however, finding ways of ensuring the safe negotiated return that addressed the intricate factors that de ne belonging at the local level for this group was essential to progressively changing the dynamics that engender exclusion and inclusion on the ground in DRC and halting the cycles of conflict perpetuated by these manufactured exclusions.

The seventh study (2012) looked at the realities facing those who had fled from Darfur and were living in the new state of South Sudan. It showed that the same mechanisms of exclusion that had led to South Sudan's secession were now in danger of creating a new form of marginalisation for those who were not viewed as part of the new South Sudan, yet had been rejected from (North) Sudan. This study owed into the eighth study (2012), which was based on interviews with individuals living in Khartoum who identified themselves as being either from South Sudan or from one of the conflict-affected areas of Sudan (specifically Darfur, Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States). It demonstrated that the same logic of discrimination that forced them from their homes had been replicated in Khartoum where they continued to be treated as second-class citizens at best, and stateless at worst.

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

The book draws on these case studies throughout the chapters. It begins with a theoretical framing for the book, providing an overview of conflict dynamics in the region set in an historical context; a description of the subsequent refugee crises throughout the region; and an exploration of the distinctions between citizenship (as a legal construct) and belonging (as a lived reality). The third chapter focuses on the relevance and nature of national belonging for those in exile. It explores the extent to which national citizenship of the 'home' country has retained its validity; and considers the extent to which there are (or are not) opportunities to form new bonds of national belonging within the host country.

The fourth chapter argues that securing legal citizenship does not automatically translate into access to rights or inclusion in the locality in which a person is living (and, indeed, vice versa). It therefore explores how refugees create—or fail to create—spaces for belonging within the specific place in which they are living. Drawing on a number of case studies, it considers some of the many components to belonging, from (amongst others) the ability to access land or other resources crucial to livelihoods, to community collaboration—the ability 'to borrow salt from your neighbours'. Specifically, it differentiates between local integration as a policy-implemented solution to ending exile, and the multiple ways in which refugees create local forms of belonging *despite* the policy context.

The fifth chapter looks at the interaction between local and national belonging, and considers both the extent to which they function independently of each other, and the extent to which they are interdependent. It explores vulnerabilities that are created when refugees create local legitimacy but lack national belonging; and vice versa. Ultimately it argues that for refugees to and a place of safety they need to create both local and national bonds of belonging that legitimise their right to not only live in a certain place, but to access resources.

The sixth chapter has a more specific geographical focus. It brings together many of the dynamics around local and national belonging through a consideration of dynamics of citizenship and belonging for those living within or in exile from Sudan. It focuses on a specific moment in the history of citizenship, as the country transitioned into two separate states—Sudan and South Sudan—as the result of a redrawing of colonial boundaries that was almost unprecedented. It looks at the intersection between citizenship and displacement in the context of those living on the margins in Khartoum; and those who were displaced from their homeland

of Darfur, and found themselves living on the ‘wrong’ side of the border—that is, in South Sudan—at the point of its independence.

The seventh chapter considers the extent to which refugee policies, and the way in which these have translated into humanitarian structures on the ground, have rarely reflected the complex realities of inclusion and exclusion—realities that are often poorly understood by the outsider; are often poorly constructed; and are then often poorly implemented. Humanitarian categories tend to ‘x’ belonging into rigid categories that are not only inefficient but can create harm for those they are supposed to protect. Thus the chapter considers the extent to which decontextualised, depoliticised humanitarianism has often done more harm than good in the search for ‘durable solutions’. In particular, the emphasis on the encampment of refugees and the impact this has had on the ability of refugees to create spaces for belonging will be explored. Finally, the conclusion draws out some of the overall themes from the research, using the notion of ‘marginalisation’ as a key organising principal lying at the centre of the analysis.

NOTES

ⁱ UNHCR (2016), ‘Burundi situation’, (<http://data.unhcr.org/burundi/regional.php> accessed 15 Jan 2016).

ⁱⁱ The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) includes in its definition of the region Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. However, for the purposes of this book, Angola, Zambia and CAR are not a primary focus.

ⁱⁱⁱ See, for instance, Michel Agier, (2011) *Managing the Undesirables*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

^{iv} ‘The disappearance of Sudan? Life in Khartoum for citizens without rights’, (2013); ‘I can’t be a citizen if I am still a refugee’: Challenges in the naturalisation process for Burundians in Tanzania’, (2013); ‘Darfurians in South Sudan: Negotiating belonging in two Sudans’, (2012); ‘Shadows of Return: the dilemma of Congolese Refugees in Rwanda’, (2011); ‘Hoping for Peace, Afraid of War: the Dilemmas of Repatriation and Belonging on the Borders of Uganda and South Sudan’, published as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Research Paper (2010) No. 196, November; ‘A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda’, carried out in partnership with the Refugee Law Project, Faculty of Law, Makerere University, (2010); ‘Who Belongs Where? Conflict, Displacement, Land and Identity in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo’, (2010); ‘Two People Can’t Wear the Same Pair of Shoes’: Citizenship, Land and the Return of Refugees to Burundi’, carried out in partnership with Rema Ministries (Burundi), (2009); ‘Going Home or Staying Home? Ending Displacement for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania’, carried out in partnership with the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration and the University of Dar es Salaam, (2008). (All on <http://www.refugee-rights.org/Programs/Citizenship/citizenship.html>)

^v Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo, (2015) ‘Forced Displacement and the Crisis of Citizenship in Africa’s Great Lakes Region: Rethinking Refugee Protection and Durable Solutions.’ *Refuge*, Vol 31 (2), December

^{vi} Agier (2011).

^{vii} Although the dominant focus throughout the book is on refugees, it also touches on issues relating to IDPs and returnees. This distinction is made in the presentation of the case study material, but otherwise the term ‘refugee’ is used as a shorthand for a broader set of policies.

^{viii} For instance, Tania Kaiser makes the point that simple delineations between home and exile are inadequate for understanding displacement and refugee status. Tania Kaiser, (2010) 'Dispersal, division and diversi - cation: durable solutions and Sudanese refugees in Uganda.' *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol. 4, no. 1, March, 44–60, p. 45.

^{ix} Oliver Bakewell, (2008) 'Research Beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research into Forced Migration.' *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol 21 (4), pp. 432–453.

^x Loren B. Landau and Roni Amit, (2014) 'Wither Policy? Southern African Perspectives on Understanding Law, 'Refugee' Policy and Protection.' *Journal of Refugee Studies*. 27(4), pp. 534–552.

^{xi} For more details on the specific methodology of each case study, please refer to the relevant working papers. All are available at <http://www.refugee-rights.org/Programs/Citizenship/citizenship.html>.

^{xii} The emphasis on repatriation is explained more fully in Chap. 7.